Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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CLUSTERS ONE, TWO AND THREE

Submitted by Australia

A. Cluster One

Universality

1. The States parties welcome the eight recent accessions to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Universal adherence to the Treaty remains an urgent priority. All States not yet party to the Treaty are called upon to accede to it at the earliest date. The States parties will make determined efforts to achieve this objective.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

2. The States parties welcome the adoption and opening for signature of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an indispensable step forward on the path to nuclear disarmament, and as the fulfilment of a principal component of the decision on principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.[1] The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty establishes a norm against nuclear testing, which is reflected in its signature by over 140 States. All States parties aim to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest possible date, as a demonstration of the strength of international support for the Treaty and in order to facilitate its entry into force at the earliest possible time.

Cut-off

3. The States parties renew their commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator of the Conference on Disarmament and the mandate contained therein.

B. Cluster Two: articles III, IV and VII

Safeguards

4. The conclusion of negotiations on the "93+2" model protocol, and its expected adoption by the special meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in May is welcomed as a significant contribution to strengthening safeguards. Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should conclude and ratify agreements with IAEA and implement the 93+2 package of safeguards as soon as possible to help ensure that safeguards are effectively strengthened and in a cost-efficient manner. These strengthened safeguards should become the new norm for comprehensive safeguards to maximize the potential of the Treaty to provide solid non-proliferation assurances.

5. All States that do not have comprehensive safeguards agreements in place, and especially the nuclear-weapon States members parties to the Treaty, should adopt the maximum number of measures identified in the model Protocol that would help contribute to the effectiveness and the efficiency of safeguards. The undertakings by a number of such States to work towards that goal is welcomed.

6. All non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty should now ensure that their commitment to the fullscope safeguards standard for new supply through practical trading arrangements is fully observed.

7. States not members of the Treaty that continue to have unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should enter into comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA without delay.

8. Nuclear-weapon States should place permanently under IAEA safeguards all of the nuclear fissile material transferred from military use to peaceful nuclear activities.

9. The safeguards agreement of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with IAEA, which remains binding and in force, should be implemented without delay. The full implementation of the Agreed Framework between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America will be an important contribution to international peace and security.

Nuclear-related export controls/transparency

10. Nuclear supplier regimes should not restrict access for developing countries to advanced technology. This would be contrary to the range of undertakings on peaceful nuclear cooperation reaffirmed most recently at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

11. The fulfilment of nuclear supplier obligations to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is facilitated by an effective non-proliferation regime of which strict and transparent nuclear supply policies are an integral part.

12. The international Seminar on the Role of Export Controls in Nuclear Non-Proliferation, to be held in Vienna on 6 and 7 October 1997 following the

forty-first session of the General Conference of IAEA, is welcomed as a first step to improve further transparency in the operation of nuclear export control regimes. All States are encouraged to attend and participate actively in this seminar.

13. Adherence by all States to the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines would be consistent with Treaty and nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty objectives of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and to facilitate cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Non-member States should receive assistance and advice about the practical and legal aspects of implementing the Guidelines from members of nuclear supplier regimes.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

14. All existing zones should come into force as soon as possible, and the process of ratification of their protocols by relevant States completed.

15. States of the regions concerned, and in particular those in regions of tension, should engage in discussions on possible arrangements for additional nuclear-weapon-free zones by the year 2000. This includes the Central Asian region for which there is now a proposal on the table under the Almaty Declaration.

16. Work on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should be intensified as a contribution to peace and stability in the region and internationally.

17. Cooperation and coordination between States parties and signatories of existing zones under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba should be actively pursued to promote the common goals of these treaties.

C. Cluster Three: Peaceful uses of nuclear energy

18. States parties reaffirm the importance they attach to ensuring the exercise of the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty.

19. States parties also reaffirm the importance they attach to the work of IAEA as the principal agent for multilateral technical cooperation in the development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and reiterate their call for every effort to be made to ensure that IAEA has the necessary financial and human resources to meet its responsibilities in the area of technical cooperation, safeguards and nuclear safety.

20. States parties welcome the progress made since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference in developing and strengthening the international legal and institutional framework within which the development of research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes takes place.

21. In this context, States parties welcome the entry into force in 1996 of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and call upon countries that have not already done so - particularly those with nuclear installations that fall within the scope of the Convention - to sign and ratify the Convention. States parties also welcome the conclusion of the negotiations on the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties note the progress that has been made towards the development of a comprehensive international nuclear liability regime and express the hope for an early conclusion to these negotiations.

22. States parties stress the importance they attach to efforts at national, regional and global levels to promote and maintain the highest standards of nuclear safety, waste management and radiation protection. They welcome the initiatives that have been taken to this end since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, including the Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, held in Moscow on 19 and 20 April 1996, and the Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia, held at Tokyo in 1996.

23. States parties note that it is in the interests of all States that the transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level waste be conducted in accordance with the highest international standards of safety and security. They note that the transportation of such materials by sea was a matter of particular concern to small island developing States and other coastal States. A number of States in this category call upon those directly engaged in the maritime transportation of radioactive materials to provide information, consistent with safety and security requirements, about the timing, route and liability arrangements to States in the vicinity of such shipments.

Notes

[1] 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Part 1 (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part I)), annex, decision 1.